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A Review of the first International Offset Program
Executive Summary
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), established under the Kyoto Protocol, is the primary 
international offset program in existence today, and while not perfect, it has helped to establish a global 
market for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions. It generates offsets through investments in GHG 
reduction, avoidance, and sequestration projects in developing countries. The United States is not party to 
the Kyoto Protocol, but was instrumental in negotiating the treaty and championing market mechanisms as 
a way to achieve the targeted reductions at lower cost. The CDM has managed to establish—in its relatively 
short eight years of existence—a credible, internationally-recognized, $2.7 billion carbon offset market with 
participation from a large number of developing countries and private investors. It has also created processes 
and methodologies that other programs are already emulating.
A vast amount of work and investment—by participating countries, the private sector, and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat—have gone into developing 
the CDM’s rules, procedures, and institutional structures. The creation and rapid growth of a large and 
unprecedented international program, however, has not been without its challenges or controversies. Issues 
have been raised regarding the governance of CDM, the quality of approved projects, and the contribution of 
CDM to sustainable development. Concerns about these issues have fueled a strong debate among U.S. policy 
analysts about the ability of the CDM to deliver emission reductions of sufficient quality and quantity, and the 
role for international offsets in any future U.S. policy framework.
Economic modeling by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) demonstrates the importance of international offsets in lowering the cost of U.S. emission 
reductions. Emission reduction projects in the developing world, such as those undertaken through the CDM, 
have the potential to be some of the lowest cost reduction options globally. Yet, these lower costs can only be 
realized if the transaction costs associated with administering an international offset program like the CDM are 
kept to a minimum while simultaneously ensuring high quality emission reductions. 
This paper outlines a set of principles for ensuring high-quality offsets, examines the CDM against these 
criteria, and reviews lessons learned, institutional changes that have been made, and the ongoing challenges.
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To maximize both its environmental and economic benefits, a GHG offset must be:
1. Additional—projects should result in emission reductions relative to a credible baseline that would not have 
occurred were it not for the existence of the incentive provided by the offset program.
2. Measurable—monitoring of emissions and calculation of emission reductions must be verifiable and based 
on credible data.
3. Independently audited—the eligibility of projects and accuracy of emission reduction calculations should be 
reviewed by expert auditors with no conflicts of interest.
4. Unambiguously owned—rights to the credits should be clearly based on domestic and international law and 
emission reductions must not be double counted.
5. Able to address/account for leakage—all emission sources impacted by the project should be accounted for, 
including those outside a project’s boundary.
6. Permanent—credits should represent a permanent removal of GHGs from the atmosphere, and in project 
types where a reduction could be reversed (e.g., afforestation), there must be a way to account for non-
permanence.
An apt characterization of the CDM to date would be “learning by doing.” This has been driven in 
part by the need to quickly operationalize a system capable of delivering credible offsets for the first Kyoto 
commitment period (2008 through 2012). Debating and developing every methodology and procedure 
before launching the program would likely have delayed the program for years. Our assessment of the CDM’s 
performance to date indicates, first, that the early focus on expediency resulted in the creation of a global GHG 
offsets market in a surprisingly short period of time, and second, that the CDM was designed with the flexibility 
to adapt with experience, which it has done and continues to do.
The downside of “learning by doing” is that naturally a variety of problems have surfaced. With only 
limited technical guidance in the early stages, project developers, auditors and even UNFCCC staff struggled 
with issues like additionality, leakage, measurement, and auditing. Consequently, it is very likely that some 
non-additional projects were initially registered and some early versions of methodologies were approved 
without full testing. The CDM Executive Board has since sought to address deficiencies and strengthen 
practices. Guidance documents and Board decisions are now more fully developed and widely available. The 
Board has also added staff and review teams to better evaluate and ensure the quality of projects before 
registration. Over the last two years, third-party auditors have also come under increased scrutiny and the 
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Board has sanctioned several companies. In general, the trend towards more rigorous project review, increased 
standardization for additionality and baselines and more auditor oversight is very encouraging.
Going forward, Kyoto Protocol parties and the Board are discussing further changes and reforms to 
increase standardization, extend CDM into countries not yet benefiting from it, and, most importantly, increase 
its efficiency and scale. GHG offsets will also continue to play a role in negotiations over the future of the 
global climate effort. As capacity builds in both the public and the private sectors of developing countries, 
access to GHG markets may serve as a potential bargaining tool for developed countries, such as the United 
States, who could be large buyers of credits. Developing countries may be more willing to accept some form of 
longer-term commitment to limit emissions in return for market access in the short term.
After years of investment, the institutional apparatus of the CDM is fully operational and widely supported 
by industry and the international community. Currently, no alternative institutional structure exists with a 
similar potential, and the creation of a new international offset system would most certainly require years of 
learning and adjustment. 
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I. Introduction and Context
In response to the changing climate, many U.S. states and the Federal government have been debating policy 
mechanisms to advance clean energy technologies and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions both domestically 
and internationally. One of the central topics over the past several years has been how and whether to design a 
market for GHG emissions. In designing a market-based policy program, legislators have had to grapple with a 
number of key questions, such as the targets and timetables for reducing emissions, the sectors of the economy 
that should fall under the emissions limit, and the mechanisms for containing the costs of the program.
As has been shown in a large number of studies, an emissions market is a cost-effective policy tool for 
mitigating GHG emissions, as it encourages the lowest cost reductions to occur first. However, not all GHG 
sources can be effectively covered by the program. Some individual sources are small (e.g., in agriculture), 
others lack good data or are not easily measured (e.g., coal mine methane), and still others may be more 
effectively dealt with through other policies (e.g., building energy efficiency). Including these types of sources 
in an emissions market could create excessive administrative burden and significantly raise overall program 
costs. Some of these emissions, however, can be integrated into the program by addressing them as emission 
offsets (also commonly called carbon offsets or offset credits). An emission offsets program can send a price 
signal to these smaller sources, encouraging innovation, incentivizing emission reduction activities, and 
perhaps providing the foundation for broader and deeper emission reduction policies in the future.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), established under the Kyoto Protocol, is the primary 
international offset program in existence today. It generates offsets through investments in GHG reduction, 
avoidance, and sequestration projects in developing countries. These offset credits, called Certified Emission 
Reduction credits (CERs), represent a reduction in one metric ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted to the 
atmosphere.1 Developed countries can use CERs to more cost-effectively achieve their Kyoto Protocol GHG 
emission reduction targets. While the United States is not a signatory to the Protocol, several U.S. state GHG 
programs, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and the Western Climate Initiative, have also 
proposed that CERs be used in their programs by firms for compliance purposes.
Apart from providing a cost-containment mechanism for developed countries to meet their Kyoto Protocol 
emission reduction targets, the CDM may play a critical role in providing private sector financing for low carbon 
technology in developing countries. At the 2009 Climate Conference in Copenhagen (COP 15), U.S. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton pledged that developed countries would mobilize $100 billion by 2020 from both 
public and private sources for climate mitigation and adaptation in the developing world. The CDM has already 
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channeled $2.7 billion2 of private sector financing to developing countries, and there is the potential that the 
United States and other developed countries can capitalize on this experience to help meet the $100 billion goal.
This paper examines the primary issues, successes, and challenges of the CDM to date. After this introduction 
and a brief introduction to offsets, section II reviews the market mechanisms found in the Kyoto Protocol and the 
CDM’s structure and processes. Section III follows with an overview of the CDM market and its role in emissions 
trading cost containment. Section IV turns to an in-depth review of how offset quality is determined under the 
CDM, including an analysis of the processes, concerns, and lessons learned for the critical criteria of additionality, 
measurement, auditing, ownership, leakage, and permanence. Finally, section V addresses the implications of 
the CDM for developing countries with regard to technology transfer, impacts on sustainable development and 
capacity building, as well as the potential risk for creating perverse incentives.
A Brief Introduction to Offsets
In the context of a cap-and-trade program, a GHG offset represents a reduction, avoidance, destruction, 
or sequestration of GHG emissions that is from a source not covered by an emissions cap or another 
emission reduction requirement. These offsets can then be used to meet an emissions reduction objective or 
requirement of a covered source or entity. In other words, provided that the reduction meets the established 
offset eligibility criteria, the purchasing firm or country is allowed to meet its compliance obligation as though 
it had either purchased an emission allowance or made the reduction itself. The essential promise of an 
offset is the achievement of a real and verifiable reduction in global GHG emissions beyond what would have 
occurred in the absence of the incentive offered by the offset program (which is equally as effective as an 
on-site emission reduction by a regulated entity).
Unlike other pollutants that have impacts proximate to their emissions source, GHGs accumulate uniformly 
throughout the earth’s atmosphere. A ton of GHGs emitted in the United States has the equivalent impact of 
a ton emitted anywhere else in the world. Therefore, from a strictly scientific perspective, a ton of emission 
reductions has the same benefit regardless of its location, and analogously, the location of emissions is 
immaterial to its climate change impacts.
Fundamentally, an offset program allows emissions to be reduced at the lowest cost, without regard 
to the boundaries of the emissions cap. If designed well, offsets will lower the overall costs of meeting a 
domestic or international emissions target, while directing investments into economically, socially, and 
environmentally beneficial activities. This potential is especially large in developing countries, where there are 
many opportunities for achieving low-cost emission reductions (a McKinsey study estimates that 67 percent of 
the global GHG emissions abatement potential is in the developing world).3 Along with reducing costs, offsets 
should be able to promote technology transfer and capacity building in sectors and countries not directly 
covered by emission reduction commitments (whether this is actually occurring requires further study).
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II. The Kyoto Protocol Market Mechanisms & CDM
The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) that sets binding GHG emissions targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European 
Community, which together are known as the Annex I countries.4 These targets collectively amount to an 
average emissions reduction of 5 percent from 1990 levels over the five-year period from 2008-2012. 
The United States is not party to the Kyoto Protocol, but was instrumental in negotiating the treaty and 
championing market mechanisms as a way to achieve the targeted reductions at lower cost.
Market mechanisms and offsets were not new concepts to U.S. policy makers. The first application of a 
tradable offset was under the 1977 Clean Air Act (CAA).5 The Act allowed a company to increase its emissions of 
a criteria pollutant if it paid another company to reduce, by a greater amount, its emissions of the same pollutant. 
In 1990, the CAA Amendments established an even broader market approach with cap-and-trade programs for 
sulfur dioxides (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from electric power plants.6 These programs have proven 
successful, as emissions have been reduced both faster and at a considerably lower cost than was predicted or 
would have been possible through a traditional command-and-control regulatory approach.7 
The success of these programs greatly influenced the United States during the negotiations of the 
Kyoto Protocol in 1997. To help developed countries more cost-effectively meet their emission targets, and 
to encourage the private sector and developing countries to contribute to emission reduction efforts, U.S. 
negotiators insisted that the Protocol include three market-based mechanisms: international emissions trading 
and two offset programs—Joint Implementation (JI) and the CDM.8 Similar to a domestic cap-and-trade 
program between companies, international emissions trading enables the transfer of emissions “allowances,” 
each worth one ton of GHGs, from one country to another while keeping the total amount of allowable 
emissions constant. JI allows companies or countries with emissions reduction commitments to fund specific 
emission reduction projects in other developed countries, and to credit the resulting emission reductions 
against their Kyoto obligations. CDM is similar to JI, except that the emission reduction projects must be done 
in developing countries. The primary function of these market mechanisms is to provide developed countries 
with flexibility on how to comply with their Kyoto Protocol emission reduction targets. 
While it does not matter from an environmental perspective where GHG reductions occur, the location 
of a reduction has economic implications because companies and countries face widely different costs of 
controlling their emissions. Hundreds of analyses, using a wide array of economic models, conclude that the 
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costs of achieving an emission reduction target are significantly lower if international emissions trading is 
permitted, rather than if each nation were to meet its emission reduction commitment domestically. A Pew 
Center study9 found that widening the carbon market from U.S.-only (“No Trading” in Figure 1) to include 
other Annex I countries lowered the U.S. carbon price by a factor of two. Expanding the market to include 
developing countries as well (“Global Trading” in Figure 1) cut the U.S. carbon price by another 50 percent. In 
general, the broader the trading possibilities, the greater the chance of finding lower cost emission reduction 
options and the lower the costs of meeting a given target will be.
Figure 1. Estimated Year 2010 Carbon Price Needed to Achieve U.S. Target under Kyoto Protocol
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While there have been relatively few projects conducted under JI over the last ten years, a vast amount of 
work and investment—by participating countries, the private sector, and the UNFCCC secretariat—has gone into 
developing the CDM’s rules, procedures, and institutional structures. This work, driven primarily by the demand 
for low-cost emissions reduction credits from the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), has resulted in the 
creation of a burgeoning global market for GHG emission offsets. Given the lack of precedent for such a large-
scale offset program and the complexities of establishing an international market mechanism, the CDM’s growth 
has been remarkable, from its first trade in 2005 to a liquid market for credits valued in 2009 at $2.7 billion.10 
The creation and rapid growth of such a large and unprecedented international program, however, has not 
been without its challenges or controversies. Issues have been raised regarding the governance of CDM, the 
quality of approved projects, and the contribution of CDM to sustainable development. Concerns about these 
issues have fueled a strong debate among U.S. policy analysts about the ability of the CDM to deliver emission 
reductions of sufficient quality and quantity, and the role for international offsets in a U.S. policy framework. 
In order to evaluate these criticisms, it is important to first understand how the CDM works, as well as the 
current state of the CDM market.
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CDM Structure and Process
The CDM Executive Board (“Board”) is the chief regulatory body for the CDM. The ten members of the 
Board and their alternates11 are elected by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and are governed by decisions of 
the Parties. The Board oversees the entire CDM process, from the project evaluation stage to the issuance of 








The Board has established a multi-stage process in which projects are proposed by developers (from the 
private and/or public sectors) and then reviewed13 at least twice before a decision is made. This decision could 
be either to approve, reject, or refer the project for further investigation. The work of the Board in reviewing 
and approving projects is supported by the UNFCCC secretariat, outside experts, and independent auditors, as 
discussed below.
Stage I: Project Design, Validation, and Registration
A project developer, which may be an individual or a company,14 initiates a new CDM project by preparing 
a standardized proposal called a Project Design Document (PDD) (Figure 2). PDDs include detailed project 
information on technologies that will be employed, the expected environmental impacts, a calculation of the 
projected emissions with and without the project, and the approved methodologies to be used for monitoring 
and quantifying emission reductions from the project. Project developers have the option to either choose 
from one of the more than 140 approved methodologies in the CDM library or propose a completely new 
methodology. Newly proposed methodologies must undergo a thorough review process by the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, independent experts, a CDM methodology panel, and the Board before final approval.
Once a PDD is completed, it is submitted to the host country’s Designated National Authority (DNA), 
usually the Ministry of Environment, which is that country’s central point of contact for CDM projects. The 
DNA reviews the proposed project and assesses whether it will contribute to national sustainable development 
goals, and if so, the DNA issues a Letter of Approval. The completed PDD must then be “validated,” for which 
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the project proponent must hire an accredited auditor, known as a Designated Operational Entity (DOE), to 
conduct an independent and thorough audit of the project proposal. These auditing firms are typically private 
companies that are judged capable of conducting credible and independent technical assessments of emission 
reduction projects.15
If the auditor deems that the proposed project meets all the CDM’s requirements and is technically sound, 
the proposal enters a thirty-day public comment period where stakeholders such as non-profit organizations 
and the local community can provide input.16 After stakeholder engagement, if the auditor is satisfied he 
submits a validation report certifying the proposed project is ready for formal review and registration by the 
Board. With the support of various technical teams, the Board assesses the proposal and validation report and 
can	1)	reject	the	project;	2)	call	for	it	to	be	improved	and	re-submitted;	or	3)	approve	it	for	registration.	After	
registration, projects generally move forward for implementation.
Stage II: Project Verification and Issuance of CDM Credits
After the project has been operating and monitored for a certain period of time (typically one year),17 the 
project developer is required to hire another accredited auditor (different from the one hired for the validation 
phase) to verify the amount of emission reductions achieved (Figure 2).18 The project’s monitoring reports and 
the auditor’s verification reports are then submitted to the Board for approval. If each report is approved, CERs 
are issued to the project participants. A project must continue to submit monitoring and audit reports and 
credits are issued for the duration of its crediting period, which for most projects is either seven or ten years 
with the opportunity to apply for two seven-year renewals.























Stage I: Project Design Stage II: Project Implementation
Document Entity
DOE: Designated Operational Entity 
EB: Executive Board
PDD: Project Design Document
PP: Project participant
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III. The CDM Market & Its Role in Cost Containment 
CDM Market Characteristics
Since its beginning in 2005, the CDM has registered over 2,400 projects and more than 2,600 others 
are in the “pipeline” at various stages of project development. This figure has been rising on average by 125 
projects per month.19 It is anticipated that the registered projects will generate over 360 million CERs annually, 
or over 2.9 billion CERs during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 2008–2012.20
CER prices are largely driven by demand from countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and firms 
regulated under the EU-ETS, as well as “unilateral” project investors wishing to sell credits to these firms 
(Figure 3).21













0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000
Source: UNEP Risoe (2010). 
Note: “Multiple” includes partnerships of two or more countries purchasing CERs, or funds such as those managed by the World Bank’s Carbon Fi-
nance Unit. “Private Investor” projects are those undertaken without advance purchase agreements by investors who do not have a predetermined 
buyer for the CERs generated. Data represents all CDM projects in the pipeline (i.e., at the validation, registration or issuance stages).
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CDM projects are located throughout the developing world, with the majority of projects occurring in the 
largest developing economies. As of March 2010, there were more than 80 countries hosting projects, with 
China and India alone hosting a combined 63 percent of the projects and producing 71 percent of expected 
annual CERs (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Expected Number of CDM Projects in the Pipeline and Annual Average CERs 
by Host Country (2008–2012)
Number of projects by host country 
Annual CERs by host country
Source: UNEP Risoe (2010). 



























While CDM projects are informally classified into 25 project types (see Appendix), there are few 
restrictions on the type of activity that may constitute a project, as long as it meets the CDM eligibility criteria. 
Renewable energy projects are the most common and account for 43 percent of CDM projects. (Figure 5). 
Cumulatively, 27 percent of emission reductions (CERs) from projects currently in the pipeline will come from 
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renewable energy projects, such as hydro, biomass energy and wind, while 23 percent will come from industrial 
hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) and nitrous oxide (N2O) projects, and 16 percent from energy efficiency projects 
(Figure 5).
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Source: UNEP Risoe (2010). 
Note: Data is as of March 2010 and represents all CDM projects in the pipeline (i.e., at the validation, registration or issuance stages).
Total Expected CERs by 2012
Number of CDM projects
These projects have gone forward ultimately because there is a market and value for CERs. The price for a 
“secondary”22 CER hit a high of $26 in July 2008, and then fell to around $10 in February 2009 in response 
to the global economic slowdown.23 The price has since recovered somewhat and CERs, as of November 2010, 
were trading around $16. For comparison, EU allowances (EUAs) are trading at about $20, which is about 29 
percent higher than a CER.24 In fact, CERs often sell at a lower price, reflecting the lower costs of abatement 
and added project risks not relevant to government-issued EUAs. The expectation that emission reduction 
opportunities are cheaper in developing countries is often used as a justification for including international 
offsets in a U.S. cap-and-trade program.
The CDM’s Role in Cost Containment
Economic modeling by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) forecasts that as the use of offsets increases, the price of domestic emission allowances 
decreases. Analysis by the EPA of the Waxman-Markey bill passed in the House in 2009 (H.R. 2454) showed 
that if international offsets were not used, domestic allowance prices could increase by 89 percent.25 More recent 
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modeling done by the EPA in 2010 of the Kerry-Lieberman American Power Act concluded that without any 
international offsets, domestic allowance prices would increase between 34 and 107 percent, depending on the 
scenario considered.26
Because the CDM projects originate in the developing world, they have the potential to be some of the 
lowest cost reduction options globally. Yet, these lower costs can only be realized if the transaction costs 
associated with administering an international offset program like the CDM are kept to a minimum while 
simultaneously ensuring high quality emission reductions. This next section reviews both the cost of mitigation 
options available in developing countries and the transaction costs involved in bringing those emission 
reductions into the carbon market.
Low-Cost Mitigation Options in Developing Countries
There is no one best estimate for the cost of reducing emissions in the developing world, but the average 
annualized investment for specific project types provides a useful proxy for the cost per ton of reducing 
emissions in CDM projects (i.e., the dollars spent per expected CER). While the estimated investment under 
the CDM varies widely by project type, from $0.79/ton for N2O projects to $391/ton for solar, it averages just 
over $25/ton across all project types (Figure 6).

























































































































































Note: Data compiled by authors taken from CDM PDDs that report expected capital expenditures (i.e., expenditures on equipment, infrastructure, 
and engineering services). Data was collected from 5,001 CDM PDDs in the pipeline through 2009,27 converted to U.S. dollars using an average 
exchange rate for the two first quarters of 2009, and expressed as annual investment (capital investment amortized over the project life span) per 
tCO2e reduced. Capital costs were amortized over the expected crediting period of the CDM project. For projects with renewal crediting periods, 
the project was assumed to undergo two renewals to the maximum of 21 years. Funding for the data collection was supplied by the World Bank, 
Development Economics Research Group.
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Although the investment cost variation among types of projects is significant, it is also somewhat 
misleading in terms of which project types offer the largest return on investment. For example, while solar 
projects represent the highest investment cost per ton, they also benefit from the additional electricity revenue 
generated (or avoiding the need to purchase electricity). Project types such as N2O and HFCs, on the other 
hand, often see a return based only on the income from CERs.
Transaction Costs
Part of the direct investment cost of a CDM project is related to putting the project through the CDM 
registration process. Specifically, these costs include preparation of documents, validation and verification 
(auditing), registration,28 and potentially developing new methodologies. If the administrative and other 
transaction costs associated with an international offset project are too high, they can outweigh any gains from 
the ability to capture lower cost emission reductions.
Wetzelaer, et al. in 2007 reviewed the CDM projects in the pipeline and determined that the transaction 
costs per ton were small—in the range of 0.05-3.5 percent of the CER price ($0.01 to 0.70 per CER).29 
Antinori and Sathaye (2007) reached similar conclusions, finding transaction costs for CDM projects ranging 
from $0.03 per CER for large projects to $4.05 per CER for smaller projects, with a weighted average of $0.36 
across all projects. More recent data from the World Bank (2009) suggests that transaction costs, including 
project preparation costs, roughly range from $0.02 per CER for large industrial projects to $1.2 per CER for 
smaller projects.30 These data demonstrate that the transaction costs can be relatively small.
The number of CERs that a project type generates significantly affects the relative transaction costs on a 
per-ton basis due to the presence of certain fixed costs. For instance, because HFC and N2O projects reduce 
GHGs with high global warming potential, the number of credits generated are typically large and thus on a 
per-ton basis the transaction costs are smaller.31 Minimizing these costs is important as they can be a barrier 
for project developers and thus dampen investment, especially for small projects. Transaction costs, however, 
are inherent in any offset program because of the essential requirements to measure, verify, and monitor 
emission reductions to ensure offset quality and ultimately program integrity.
15
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IV. Assessing CDM Offset Quality
One of the fundamental considerations when evaluating the success of an offset program such as the CDM 
is whether the credits generated by the program meet well-accepted standards of offset quality. The first step 
in making such an assessment is to define the quality criteria against which the process and its projects can be 
evaluated.32 This section defines these criteria, assesses the CDM against them, and then, where appropriate, 
discusses options for improvement.
With an aim to preserve the environmental integrity of a cap-and-trade system, a high quality offset must be:
1. Additional—projects should result in emission reductions relative to a credible baseline that would not have 
occurred were it not for the existence of the incentive provided by the offset program.
2. Measurable—monitoring of emissions and calculation of emission reductions must be verifiable and based 
on credible data.
3. Independently audited—the eligibility of projects and accuracy of emission reduction calculations should be 
reviewed by expert auditors with no conflicts of interest.
4. Unambiguously owned—rights to the credits should be clearly based on domestic and international law and 
emission reductions must not be double counted.
5. Able to address/account for leakage—all emission sources impacted by the project should be accounted for, 
including those outside a project’s boundary.
6. Permanent—credits should represent a permanent removal of GHGs from the atmosphere, and in project types 
where a reduction could be reversed (e.g., afforestation), there must be a way to account for non-permanence.
1. Additionality
One of the most critical criteria for offset quality, and one of the most difficult to determine, is 
additionality. If a CDM project would have been implemented “anyway” regardless of whether there was any 
potential to earn offset credits, then the reduction should not be considered “additional.” Because an offset 
credit is treated in a cap-and-trade program as though the purchasing entity had bought an allowance or made 
the reduction itself, the offset credit must represent a reduction that is beyond what would have occurred in a 
credible baseline scenario.33
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Although the concept of additionality is not new to U.S. environmental or energy policies,34 it is a difficult 






Auditors and program administrators have developed and applied techniques for many project types that 
attempt, through multiple tests and layers of review, to provide a reasonable approximation that the project 
provides “additional” emission reductions. Perfection, however, is neither realistic nor attainable. Many offset 
advocates have called for an improved process that minimizes both the number of non-additional projects that 
are mistakenly approved and the number of truly additional projects that are incorrectly rejected.35 While better 
data, more refined assessment techniques and more thorough proposal reviews can all reduce errors, they can 
also increase the time it takes for project review, increase the administrative burden and raise the transaction 
costs previously discussed. Thoroughness and transaction costs thus must be carefully weighed to ensure 
that an offset program delivers the widespread incentives for emission reductions and low carbon technology 
deployment desired, while ensuring that environmental goals are met as well. The following section outlines the 
process currently used to assess additionality in the CDM.
The CDM Additionality Process
The CDM defines a project as additional if it passes a multi-step process36 that determines if GHG 
emissions are below those that “would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.”37,38 The first 
step is the establishment of a credible baseline. A baseline is the scenario that predicts GHG emissions that 
would have occurred without the CDM. It is against this baseline of projected emissions that a project’s net 
emission reductions are measured. In other words, the estimated baseline emissions less the measured project 
emissions equal the project’s emission reductions (and ultimately the number of CERs issued). An offset’s 
credibility hinges in large part on the strength and realistic grounding of this projected baseline scenario. 
Obviously, if the resulting emissions from the proposed project and the baseline emissions without the project 
are the same then there are no “additional” emission reductions. Similarly, if the proposed project results in 
an increase in emissions relative to the baseline scenario, then again there are no emission reductions and no 
credits would be issued.
Establishing a baseline scenario and determining additionality under the CDM includes four steps. The 
first step is to identify all possible alternatives to the proposed project. For example, suppose a manufacturer 
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generates process steam by operating a boiler run with heavy fuel. Now, suppose that this producer proposes to 
change its steam-generating equipment to operate on wood residue (e.g., sawmill waste) instead of heavy fuel 
oil. Under the assumption that combusting this wood emits no net CO2 emissions, by switching to this new fuel 
the producer will be lowering its overall GHG emissions.39




with one that operates on natural gas or removing the old boiler and importing the steam from a 
neighboring company.
When identifying likely baseline scenarios, all relevant current or planned policies and regulations must be 
taken into account. If there is a regulation in place that requires the changes described in the proposed project 
(e.g., all boilers must operate on wood residue), then the emission reductions would eventually occur by force 
of law. No additional intervention is then needed to enable the project’s implementation and the proposed 
project would not be additional.40
The second step is to establish a complete list of realistic barriers that may prevent or inhibit any of the 
alternative baseline scenarios from occurring. Such barriers may include:
•		 Investment barriers. For example, project developers in rural Africa may not be able to access 
investment capital even for potentially profitable projects.
•		 Technological barriers. For example, a region may lack the infrastructure and/or skilled labor necessary 
to implement, operate and maintain a new technology that might be more commonplace in the 
developed world.
•		 Other barriers specific to the region or country. For example, some technologies may be unsuitable in 
tropical climate conditions, or local government policies or cultural norms may forbid or discourage 
their use.
If it can be documented that a scenario would be prevented by one or more of the above barriers, then it 
is eliminated from consideration. If barriers prevent all but one of the identified scenarios, then that scenario 
is selected as the baseline. If the proposed project activity itself is the only remaining baseline scenario 
candidate, then the proposal is deemed to be not additional.
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In keeping with the boiler example above, there may not be a neighboring company producing steam or the 
natural gas pipeline infrastructure may not extend to the project site, rendering these two alternatives infeasible. If 
several feasible scenarios are left after the barrier analysis, then the CDM requires a subsequent investment analysis. 
It is also possible for a project to skip the barrier analysis and go directly to the investment analysis, if the project 
proponent believes that this test would be the most conclusive. A proponent thus has the option of doing either the 
barriers	test	or	the	investment	analysis;	of	the	two,	the	barriers	analysis	is	the	most	common.
An investment analysis typically makes use of financial indicators that are appropriate to the project type 
and decision-making context.41 The scenario with the best financial performance is then selected as the baseline 
scenario. Because of the potential for manipulation in an investment analysis, the CDM requires sensitivity tests 
to be conducted to observe how changes in values of key variables affect the results of the analysis.42
Again, using the previous boiler example, if there were no neighboring company producing steam, and 
the natural gas pipeline infrastructure did not extend to the project site, these two technological alternatives 
would be infeasible and only two options would remain: keeping the heavy fuel oil boiler or switching to wood 
residue. If the investment analysis clearly demonstrates that maintaining the status quo is the most financially 
attractive alternative, then this would be considered the baseline scenario.
The fourth and final step in determining additionality is the common practice analysis. This analysis 
is a credibility check on the previous steps and looks at the extent to which the proposed project type has 
already spread throughout the relevant industry and geographical area. Project proponents must provide data 
on the extent to which activities similar to the proposed project (not including other approved CDM projects) 
have been implemented previously or are currently underway. If the proposed project appears to be common 
practice, then the proponents must demonstrate why theirs is distinct43 from these similar activities.
If the proposed CDM project will reduce emissions compared to the baseline scenario identified through 
these four steps, then the project is deemed additional. Each project must submit documentation based on the 
above process to an independent auditor, who must certify its accuracy before it is submitted to the Board for 
further consideration and project registration.
Additionality Concerns and Analysis
In spite of having a fairly rigorous multi-step process to determine additionality, concern has been 
expressed about the additionality of some CDM projects and it is widely recognized, even by the Board, that 
some non-additional projects were likely approved in the early period of the CDM.44 Initially the program 
was focused on the promotion of market liquidity through the early issuance and trading of CERs, and it 
had neither the procedures nor the resources to thoroughly review all projects.45 Over 80 percent of projects 
during this period (2005 to early 2007, Figure 7) were registered with little Board review. Compounding this 
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lack of review, there was also less guidance available in the early years for project developers, auditors, or 
even the Board on how to apply the concept of additionality. In one study, Au Yong (2009) asserts that as of 
August 2008, 26 percent of registered CDM projects (primarily wind and hydro projects) were of questionable 
additionality because CER revenues improved the internal rate of return (IRR) for the project by less than 2 
percent.46 The project IRR, however, is only one aspect of a project’s viability and other barriers may exist, 
which might imply that Au Yong’s estimate could be high. Unfortunately, there is no perfect way to assess 
additionality in the CDM process and further study is needed.
As the program has matured over the last several years, a great deal of learning and program improvements 
have taken place. The knowledge and skills of all of the players in the CDM process (e.g., project developers, 
auditors, the various CDM panels and teams, as well as the UNFCCC secretariat) have increased greatly, 
leading to higher quality project proposals as well as more systematic and rigorous review of project proposals. 
For example, a more stringent early selection process is now taking place as auditors indicate they are more 
frequently refusing to audit projects unless their initial evaluation indicates that the project is likely to earn 
their certification and be registered by the Board. 
The CDM has also put in place more detailed methods and requirements, added new layers of audit and 
review, and increased the human resources dedicated to the process. Specifically, both to increase the rigor of 
the process and to deal with the influx of new projects, the Board established a separate registration team that 
assesses each project and highlights potential issues for the Board’s review. The UNFCCC secretariat also now 
provides more resources and staff support to the review process by summarizing both project documentation 
and the findings of the audit and review processes, which increase the efficiency of the Board (Table 1).47
Table 1. UN Resources Dedicated to Administering the CDM
Resource item 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total annual budget (US$ millions) – 11.2 15.3 22.0 28.1 34.5
Professional staff 7 24 47 62 93 122
Service staff 5 16 24 31 44 48
Source: UNFCCC (2010a), UNFCCC (2009a), and UNFCCC (2005a)
Note: Does not include outside experts, Executive Board, panel, team, or workgroup members. Also, 2010 data excludes 24 staff 
members shared with JI team and information technology group.
These improvements in the scrutiny of the CDM registration process began to have a significant effect in 
2007. Prior to this time, the proportion of projects rejected or selected for more rigorous investigation by the 
Board was around 10 percent, while in 2009 it had increased to 61 percent (Figure 7).
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Despite these improvements, the single largest reason for rejection of proposed CDM projects is the inability 
of project proponents to credibly demonstrate additionality using the process described above (Table 2). The 
second most common reason is the improper use of an approved baseline and monitoring methodology.
Table 2. Reasons for Project Reviews and Rejections
Reason Project under Review Project Rejection
Failure to demonstrate additionality 67% 71%
Improper use of the baseline & monitoring methodology 27% 25%
Other 6% 4%
Source: IGES (2010). 
Note: Data are based on all CDM projects in the pipeline as of June 2010. The values should read, for example: since the beginning of the CDM, 
71 percent of all rejected CDM projects were rejected due to the project developer’s failure to adequately demonstrate additionality.
Because the CDM process is still evolving, the process for determining additionality under CDM is also still 
evolving and as such is still largely reliant on somewhat subjective judgments of project proponents, auditors, and 
the Board. As a consequence, project proponents continue to submit proposals with little certainty as to whether they 
will be approved.48 The amount of time required for project approval also continues to be lengthy, due in part to more 
thorough review measures. Greater transparency and standardization of the additionality process—as well as more 
training and professionalization of the Board, its support staff, project proponents and auditors—are still needed.49
Additionality Lessons Learned
While the CDM’s additionality process has evolved and improved with growth and experience, it has 
become increasingly clear that new approaches are needed to reduce the subjectivity of the process for 
applicants and reviewers, increase efficiency, and provide greater investor certainty.50 These more standardized 
approaches include options such as the development of performance standards (e.g., additionality and 
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baseline benchmarks) for certain project types and lists of specific project types that are automatically deemed 
additional or non-additional (i.e., positive and negative lists).51
The development of performance standards or pre-approved project type lists would require quantitative 
metrics for each project type and an understanding of the presiding economic and technological conditions. 
These standardized approaches should increase the efficiency of the process and, if carefully designed, they 
would also improve the accuracy of additionality determinations. However, developing and maintaining these 
metrics for the wide array of project types and countries would require significant resources, time, and expertise. 
That said, such an investment would likely make sense for the most common project types, as well as for 
those in which additionality is more obvious, such as, where credit revenue is expected to be large relative 
to other project revenue sources.52 In fact, the CDM has begun approving a few standardized methodologies 
for determining additionality and baselines, such as the methodology for the manufacture of energy-efficient 
refrigerators which provides efficiency benchmarks for calculating the energy savings of refrigeration, equipment, 
and pre-approved additionality for certain types of small-scale renewable and energy efficiency projects.53
The application of a discount factor on the number of credits generated by a project has also been proposed as 
a way to address additionality.54 While a discount factor could attempt to take into account the uncertainties in the 
process of determining additionality for each project type, developing these factors would be challenging. Furthermore, 
unless these factors were specific to each individual project, they would equally penalize all projects of a given type 
regardless of their quality. A discount rate also does nothing to prevent the approval of non-additional projects.
2. Measurement
Accurate measurement is fundamental to ensuring offset quality, and CDM methodologies generally 
provide rigorous requirements and specifications for how emission reductions are calculated. The CDM requires 
the measurement of actual project emissions and, in many cases, the use of actual measurement data for 
project baselines (e.g., historical production data). In the several years since the start of the CDM, over 140 
standardized baseline and monitoring methodologies and tools have been approved that address the specific 
technical issues for a wide diversity of project types (Appendix)55 as well as providing standardized and detailed 
rules for monitoring emissions, calculating emission reductions, and estimating emissions leakage (leakage is 
addressed in a later section).56
Baseline and monitoring methodologies are initially drafted and submitted by project developers. These 
proposed methodologies are first made available for public comment, and then must be certified by an 
independent auditor as technically valid and aligned with CDM requirements before they are reviewed by a 
panel of technical experts, known as the CDM methodology panel. Experts are drawn from a pool of hundreds, 
who attest to having no conflict of interest with the proposed project or parties participating in the project. 
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Numerous experts from the United States participate on these panels and serve as peer reviewers.57 Based 
on the recommendations of its methodology panel, the Board reviews each methodology before approving, 
rejecting, or specifying revisions. If approved, a methodology becomes a standard for use by other CDM 
projects in the same category. Approved methodologies are frequently revised by the CDM methodology panel 
based on new science and experience from their application in actual projects.
CDM methodologies are public and follow the principle of conservativeness, which means that 
assumptions, equations, and procedures are considered intentionally biased to ensure that emission reductions 
are not overestimated.58 Because the CDM methodology library predates most other regional and international 
programs, its methodologies have laid the technical foundation for other mandatory and voluntary GHG 
emission reduction programs around the world, including those in the United States.59
Measurement Concerns and Analysis
One concern often expressed about the CDM process is the project-by-project nature of each methodology. In the 
early days of the CDM, there were few standardized methodologies available and project developers had to propose new 
methodologies for quantifying emission reductions and also incur the expense for their development and review. Over 
time and as experience has been gained in applying methodologies to actual projects, many of these methodologies 
have been repeatedly re-examined, revised and improved. Similar methodologies have also been consolidated into the 
largest library of standardized GHG offset project protocols in the world. The applicable methodology for hydro and 
wind projects, for example, has been revised multiple times and used more than 1300 times.
While revision is essential as data and knowledge are improved, some project developers and auditors have 
complained about stranded investments when methodologies were revised after a project had been initiated.60 
To address this problem, the rules of the CDM have been altered to delay the effective date of methodological 
revisions to give project developers a reasonable period of time to plan their investments.
Measurement Lessons Learned
Overall, large investments of expertise and time have gone into developing CDM measurement requirements 
resulting in technically rigorous methodologies.61 A recent comparative study of methodologies from various offset 
programs for the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) found that CDM methodologies were consistently the highest 
quality for each type of project considered.62 The existence of methodologies can be a significant benefit for new 
offset programs because methodologies are essentially public goods. As public goods they also suffer from the 
classic problem that no one wants to bear the costs of developing them (since creation of the first methodology 
for a project type basically gives away free intellectual capital to other project developers). And, while these 
methodologies are “public goods”, the transparency of the approval process for some methodologies has been 
lacking, such that technical justifications for these decisions are not always clear to project proponents.63
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With an increasingly large and detailed library of methodologies, it is a challenge for the CDM to 
continuously review and improve existing methodologies while also considering new methodology submissions. 
Plus, with increased standardization of additionality and baseline approaches, there will be even greater 
demands on experts for the measurement and collection of metrics upon which to build standardized 
approaches. The Board will increasingly require a system of consolidated rules, decisions and guidance 
documents as well as professionalized staff and auditors with greater expertise to maintain and expand 
measurement rigor and specificity.64
3. Auditing
The concept of using audits for quality assurance and to ensure credibility is not new. It derives from the 
tradition of financial auditing and technical inspections common in many industries. The CDM requires two 
specific types of auditing—one for validation and the other for verification. As noted previously, validation is 
generally undertaken prior to implementation of the proposed project to ensure that it meets all of the CDM’s 
eligibility requirements whereas verification is the periodic audit of a project’s estimated GHG emission reductions.
The validation and verification processes enlist resources and expertise from the private sector to help 
assess the eligibility and performance of emission reduction projects. The audits are performed by independent 
third parties called Designated Operational Entities (DOEs or auditors). The Board, with the support of an 
accreditation panel and assessment teams, accredits auditing firms who have demonstrated that they are 
technically competent, free of conflicts of interest, and have sufficient quality control and management 
systems in place. A CDM assessment team (CDM-AT) investigates each auditing firm when it applies and again 
when it renews its application and then it reports its findings to the CDM Accreditation Panel (CDM-AP). The 
CDM-AP makes technical recommendations to the Board on each application for accreditation.
To demonstrate that they have sufficient technical competency, CDM audit firms are accredited separately 
for each of the CDM’s 15 sectoral scopes (e.g., an auditor needs separate accreditation for agricultural 
projects and energy industry projects). Specifically, a CDM accreditation assessment team reviews an 
auditor’s application materials, makes an on-site inspection of their management systems, and evaluates their 
performance during an actual project audit.65
Once a CDM project has been implemented and emission reductions have occurred, the project must 
undergo verification before credits can be issued. Except for small projects,66 verification must be carried out 
by a different auditor from the one that conducted the validation to ensure the audit is not biased by past 
opinions or errors. After they have certified the proposal or credit issuance request, the auditor submits the 
project documentation to the Board on behalf of the project developers, who have the responsibility for both 
selecting auditors as well as paying costs of validation and verification.
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Auditing Concerns and Analysis
Auditing under the CDM is technically well-developed, but serious structural problems remain within the 
overall quality assurance processes. Auditors bear a significant portion of the burden for reviewing projects, 
and because they are paid by the project developers, there is the potential for conflicts of interest that could 
result in less than rigorous project auditing.
Further, while project auditing is structured to facilitate competition between firms, current demand for services 
from the 26 accredited auditors significantly exceeds the capacity of these firms and delay is the result.67 Figure 
8 illustrates the gap between projects submitted to the Board and those that have completed the validation audit. 
The number of projects seeking validation has increased substantially, while the number of projects that have been 
registered has not followed the same steep trend. Notably, the average number of projects that have requested 
validation has increased from 5 per month in 2004 to around 100 per month in 2009. This type of backlog not only 
delays the project approval process, it also can lead to less than high quality auditing and is a disincentive for new 
project investment. In the scramble to meet client demands, the competency of some auditors and the rigor of their 
review may be compromised as audit firms attempt to finish projects quickly in order to handle the growing backlog. 
One of the most serious issues for maintaining the quality of CDM projects is the impact of this rapid growth on the 
adequate supply of audit firms with the necessary technical competency and experience.
Figure 8.  Projects Submitted for Validation and Projects Registered Over Time
Source: UNEP Risoe (2010). 
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The job of ensuring the competency of audit firms primarily rests with the CDM accreditation process. In a 
demonstration of its growing concern with the quality of audit work, beginning in November 2008 the Board 
temporarily suspended the accreditation of four of its auditing firms for problems with their audit practices 
and other non-conformities, including a lack of human resources and competency. After corrective actions 
were taken, the accreditation of two of these audit firms was reinstated in December 2009.68
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The huge demand for audit firms may have one redeeming quality—it might help with the inherent conflict of 
interest that can arise because auditors are “beholden” to the firms that hire them. In a situation where there is a 
shortage of audit firms and there is no lack of clients, client loyalty (and the inherent conflict of interest) may be 
somewhat reduced since firms can always find another client if their audit results are not positive. While this may be 
the case now, the auditing element of the CDM is set up to incentivize competition between firms. Consequently, the 
supply-demand imbalance for auditors should eventually resolve itself and with this resolution, the pressures to attract 
project clients and the incentives that arise from being “beholden” to those that pay the bills will be more significant.
Auditing Lessons Learned
Since the launch of the CDM, auditors, the Board, and project developers have gained tremendous experience 
on how to perform, prepare, and review audits. The Board, in an effort to improve the efficiency of the review process, 
has also added staff and internal review teams which have helped to decrease the average time required to complete 
the project validation and registration stage from just over 600 days down to 285 days (2004-2008).69,70 As of March 
2010, more than 660 projects have undergone verification and more than 385 million CERs have been issued.
Table 3 shows the number of projects that have been issued CERs, as well as the success rate of different 
project types. The success rate is a measure of number of CERs actually issued relative to the number of 
CERs predicted in each project’s original design documents. Projects with a success rate below 100 percent 
have delivered fewer CERs than expected, while projects above 100 percent have exceeded expectations. 
Table 3 demonstrates the importance of auditing and reviewing projects before issuing CERs because actual 
performance often significantly differs from expectations.
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Table 3. Delivery on CER Expectations
Types of CDM Project Projects Issued Credits (’000s) Actual Versus Predicted
Biomass energy 129 16,359 86%
Cement 8 1,321 69%
CO2 capture 1 10 31%
Coal bed/mine methane 12  3,379 47%
Energy efficiency industry 26  1,384 83%
Energy efficiency own generation 62  20,858 80%
Energy efficiency service 1  6 63%
Energy efficiency supply side 7 425 78%
Fossil fuel switch 31 7,842 52%
Fugitive 2 4,600 114%
Geothermal 5 684 38%
HFCs 18 237,303 105%
Hydro 203 24,221 89%
Landfill gas 51 10,644 36%
Methane avoidance 66 6,897 47%
N2O 21 114,195 123%
Solar 1  1 18%
Transport 2 201 42%
Wind 171 24,246 84%
Grand Total 817 474,577 95.6%
Source: UNEP Risoe (2010) CDM Pipeline Overview, Analysis, Table 2, accessed 17 December 2010.
Note: Data represents registered CDM projects where issuance was requested. 
When the CDM process was being negotiated, it was expected that the program could largely, if not completely, 
rely on independent auditors to assure the quality of offsets. It is now clear that the CDM, not unlike other 
industries that have relied on private sector auditors and rating agencies, requires a greater degree of qual-
ity assurance oversight. In response, the Board has enlarged its support staff, increased oversight of auditing 
practices, and more thoroughly reviewed projects even after they have been audited. In addition, the Board, 
in cooperation with auditing firms, released a detailed Validation and Verification Manual (VVM) in November 
2008. While it is expected that this manual will improve the quality and consistency of CDM project auditing, 
it provides limited guidance on key issues such as additionality. To further ensure the competency of audit 
firms, more standardized training, testing, and/or professional certification is needed for individuals employed 
by audit firms.71 Similarly, those who oversee auditors in the CDM’s accreditation assessment process would 
also benefit from training, testing and professional development.
Finally, to better align the incentives of auditors with the objectives of the CDM and avoid potential 
conflicts of interest, auditors could be assigned to projects by the Board instead of being selected by project 
developers and paid using an established fee schedule.
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4. Ownership
Offsets can be both a legal entitlement to emit GHG emissions and a tradable commodity with a market 
value. As such, they can convey a quasi-property right,72 making it of paramount importance that an offset’s 
creation, title of ownership, and conditions for exchange are clearly defined, documented, and tracked in an 
unambiguous and transparent manner. The creation of offset credits used within a domestic or international 
emissions trading program needs to be sanctioned by all relevant governments and supported by explicit legal 
safeguards for settling ownership disputes and preventing double counting. The CDM has mechanisms in place 
to ensure these ownership characteristics.
Prior to being submitted for registration, each project must obtain a written Letter of Approval from the 
host country government as well as any other countries actively participating in the project. Every country 
participating in the CDM must establish its Designated National Authority (DNA) to administer this approval 
process. In approving a project, governments effectively recognize the identified project participants as having 
ownership rights over any CERs issued.73 The allocation and transfer of CERs among project participants and 
other private parties is separately defined through private contracts between those parties.
Offset credits are individually serialized and accounted for in a CDM registry, in which transfer of ownership 
is clearly documented to prevent double counting. The CDM registry is linked with national government 
registries under the Kyoto Protocol and data transaction checking procedures, equivalent to those used by the 
banking and financial industry, are utilized. The CDM registry assigns a unique account number for each market 
participant and each CER can only be held in one account at any given time.74 The registry is designed to enable 
the transfer of CERs between national holding accounts. For a transfer to take place, project participants must 
have authorization from the developed country wishing to receive CERs into their national registry, and from the 
host developing country that initially approved the project.75 The legal and credit registry processes under the 
CDM are generally considered sufficient to ensure that CERs are unambiguously owned and transacted without 
double counting, while also respecting national sovereignty. The issue last year where Hungary resold some 
CERs provides an example of how the registries assure no double counting, since the CERs were submitted for 
compliance, their serial numbers were already “accounted” for in the EU registries. Thus, they could not be 
used again in the EU-ETS, as the registries would have identified them as invalid. 
5. Leakage
Under the CDM, leakage is defined as the net measurable change in GHG emissions that occur outside 
a project’s boundary,76 which can be directly attributable to the project.77 For example, an offset project that 
prevents deforestation in one area could simply result in trees harvested elsewhere. If there is no decrease in 
the overall level of deforestation, the emissions from deforestation simply “leaked” to another location that 
would not have otherwise been deforested. Leakage must be considered for all project types, but it is especially 
challenging for forestry projects.78
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Offset program methodologies must address leakage to prevent the emission reductions claimed by some 
projects from simply being an artifact of incomplete accounting. Specific rules and methods for defining 
project boundaries as well as monitoring and calculating leakage are specified in each of the CDM project 
methodologies. Project developers must follow the prescribed procedures in each methodology for quantifying 
leakage and deducting it from the total credited reductions. Transportation projects, as well as forestry and 
other land-use project types, continue to present CDM with some of the most vexing challenges for applying 
approaches to address leakage.
6. Permanence
For some types of offset projects, emission reductions can be reversed. For example, CO2 sequestered by a 
forestry project could be released back into the atmosphere, voluntarily or accidently, if the forest is prematurely 
harvested or destroyed due to a forest fire, disease, or insect infestation. Provisions are thus needed to monitor 
and account for any actual reversals. For now, because of the types of projects currently allowed under the CDM, 
this threat is limited to afforestation and reforestation projects that biologically sequester CO2.
The approach used by CDM to address permanence has been to define a special type of expiring or 
“temporary” credit (tCER)79 that must be replaced by a specific time in the future. Temporary credits fully 
account for the potential of reversals with biological carbon sequestration projects. However, both because they 
need to be replaced and because the EU has prohibited their use under its cap-and-trade program, they trade 
at lower prices than permanent CERs and have inhibited investment activity in forestry projects.
Since deforestation accounts for over 15 percent of global GHG emissions, there is a renewed interest 
in forestry offsets, which has led to consideration of other options to deal with potential reversals. These 
options include, but are not limited to, reserve pools, buffer accounts, project insurance, and bonding. Reserve 
pools require that a portion of the credits generated by all projects at risk of reversal be put into a collective 
insurance pool. Buffer accounts require that the risk of reversal for each project be quantified and, based on 
the project’s risk rating, a portion of the credits generated are set aside as a buffer in the event of a reversal. 
Project insurance functions similarly to other types of insurance. If a reversal occurs, then the insurance 
provider would be required to replace the credits on behalf of the insurance policy holder. Project developers 
could also be required to purchase and hold bonds that would be sufficient in value to replace any credits 
lost to a reversal. Overall, the approach currently employed by CDM—the use of temporary credits—while 
more than fully addressing the issue of permanence, has not been widely accepted by policy makers or project 
investors as it appears to have inhibited investment in forestry projects. The EU specifically does not allow 
temporary credits in their program, and afforestation and reforestation projects account for only 0.54 percent 
of all registered projects.80
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V. Implications for Developing Countries
Although the primary objective of the CDM is to stimulate emission reductions in developing countries 
while giving developed countries some economic flexibility to meet their targets, the CDM also has another 
objective—to promote sustainable development and the transfer of cleaner technologies to developing 
countries. This section discusses to what extent the CDM appears to have achieved these two objectives as well 
as the broader geopolitical implications of the CDM within international climate change policy.
CDM’s Role in Technology Transfer
While historically developed countries have been the main contributors of GHG emissions in the 
atmosphere, more recently emissions from developing countries, primarily the large emerging economies, has 
been on the rise. An International Energy Agency study concluded that 56 percent of the growth in emissions 
between now and 2030 will be from China and India. By incentivizing the private sector to seek out low-cost 
emission reduction opportunities in developing countries, international offset programs bring human resources, 
information, and capital to these countries while also transferring mitigation technologies.
The UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol both require participating countries to promote and cooperate in the 
development, application and diffusion (transfer) of technologies. Although the CDM does not have an explicit 
technology transfer mandate, it does appear to contribute to the transfer of technology to developing countries.
In each CDM PDD, project developers include a description of whether or not the technologies proposed are 
environmentally safe and if there will be a transfer in technological “know-how” to the developing country host. 
It may be inferred from the information in PDDs that project developers almost universally interpret technology 
transfer to mean the acquisition of equipment and/or knowledge not previously available in the host country.
Seres and Haites (2008) analyzed the claims made in 3,296 PDDs and found that technology transfer was 
involved in 36 percent of the reviewed projects accounting for 59 percent of the annual emission reductions. 
They also concluded that technology transfer varied widely across project types, but occurred more often in larger 
projects. It was also more common for projects that have foreign participants, possibly because those projects tend 
to be larger. Five countries were the sources of over 70 percent of the transfer of equipment or knowledge under 
the CDM: Japan, Germany, the United States, France, and Great Britain (16 percent of the high tech equipment 
and 11 percent of the hired expertise used in CDM projects came from the United States). Greater participation 
by the United States in the CDM would likely increase the technology transfer of U.S. technologies to developing 
countries, thereby leading to greater exports and business opportunities for U.S. businesses.
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This study also found that as more projects of a given type are implemented in a country, the rate of 
technology transfer declines, but the process facilitates the wider adoption of transferred technologies in the 
host country because a local knowledge base is created.81
CDM’s Impact on Sustainable Development
In addition to reducing GHG emissions and promoting technology transfer, CDM projects can help to 
bring economic development and broader environmental benefits to poor regions of the world. For example, 
a renewable energy project in rural Africa can create employment opportunities, improve lighting and 
refrigeration for medicines, provide water purification, and prevent deforestation from the harvesting of 
fuel wood and the operation of polluting diesel generators. While there may be such co-benefits for many 
projects, by most accounts, explicit systems have not been established to ensure that the CDM’s sustainable 
development goals are achieved.82
The UN defines sustainable development as a strategy that “meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”83 However, the Kyoto Protocol does 
not define sustainable development explicitly, nor does it provide guidance on how it should be achieved 
or measured within the CDM. As such, the promotion of sustainable development under the CDM is largely 
delegated to host developing country governments, acting through their DNAs.84 To support host country 
governments in their decision-making process, the CDM requires that project proposals include an explanation 
of how they contribute to sustainable development. Yet there are few, if any, cases of projects being rejected 
by host country DNAs, which could be seen as an indication that national sustainable development criteria are 
insufficiently ambitious or are not being rigorously applied by DNAs.85 
Most developing countries do not appear to favor projects with high sustainable development benefits 
over other projects that have few or no sustainable development benefits.86 Developing countries have few 
incentives to apply stringent criteria for sustainable development since they are effectively competing for CDM 
projects with other developing countries. More stringent standards could raise the cost of projects and deter 
potential investors. The CDM review process does include procedures to ensure projects do not cause adverse 
economic, social, or environmental harm. Yet, few procedures exist to ensure that projects produce social and 
environmental sustainable development benefits.87 Until more specific sustainable development criteria—
at the global or national level—are introduced, it is difficult to objectively assess to what degree the CDM 
contributes to this goal.
Early in the CDM program, a significant fraction of the emission reductions have come from a few large 
projects that reduced GHG emissions at low cost, for example industrial HFC and N2O abatement projects, 
but which delivered limited sustainable development benefits other than reduced GHGs.88 Although these 
projects produced high quality offsets at a low cost, they did little to introduce innovative technologies, reduce 
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other forms of pollution, or otherwise benefit local communities. Similarly, the vast majority of CDM project 
investment has gone to a few relatively larger economies in the developing world, bypassing the poorest 
countries that are arguably in greater need of assistance (Figure 4 on page 11). The international offset market 
will naturally gravitate towards emission reduction opportunities with the lowest cost (including transaction 
costs such as those related to obtaining approval from host country DNAs) and no quotas currently exist for 
how many reductions can come from particular countries or geographic regions. The offset market has therefore 
targeted countries with the greatest emission-reduction potential and favorable investment climates (e.g., 
China, India, Brazil, and Mexico). The case of the HFC and N2O projects is simply an example of the market 
capturing the “lowest hanging fruit” first.
Arguably, the limited success of the CDM in achieving its sustainable development goals can be partially 
attributed to the insistence of national governments on preserving sovereignty over their own domestic 
development decisions. The autonomy of each country’s Designated National Authority (DNA) to approve or 
reject projects is an example of this. Consequently, the lack of emphasis on sustainable development should 
not be attributed solely to the CDM program nor should it be a rationale for rejecting the CDM as a source of 
international offsets. Furthermore, as most of the low hanging fruit has already been picked, more investment 
has recently gone into energy efficiency and renewable energy projects (i.e., projects with greater potential for 
promoting low-emission economic development) instead of the large industrial GHG capture and destruction 
projects. Numerous changes to the CDM are also underway that could lead to more projects that contribute to 
sustainable development, including the adoption of rules to allow a “program of activities” or “programmatic 
CDM” (e.g., multiple small-scale energy efficiency improvements).89
CDM’s Role in Capacity Building
Similar to promoting sustainable development, the CDM has a role to increase the host country’s 
capacity and experience in carbon mitigation projects. Through engagement with offset projects and the 
CDM, the private and public sectors in developing countries gain experience in areas such as project finance, 
environmental assessment, emissions monitoring, and emissions trading. As these countries develop the 
experience and institutions to engage in carbon trading, they will likely become more capable of successfully 
initiating and meeting GHG mitigation goals.90
A great deal of private capital and a growing community of public and private sector personnel are actively 
engaged in the CDM market. Technical experts from around the world, including in developing countries, are 
now actively engaged with the technical, institutional, and financial elements necessary to build a robust global 
emissions trading market. To ensure that CERs are globally comparable in their quality, this capacity building needs 
to be further formalized and professionalized (e.g., through educational and personnel certification programs).
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Perverse Incentives
Concern has been raised from a number of sources that monetizing emission reductions from some types 
of sources can create perverse incentives and actually cause emissions to increase. This concern has been 
most prominently associated with CERs generated from reducing emissions from the industrial gas HFC-23. 
Trifluoromethane, or HFC-23, is a waste gas resulting from the production of the refrigerant gas HCFC-22. 
HFC-23 has a very large global warming potential (GWP) value meaning that every ton of HFC-23 destroyed is 
equivalent to destroying 11,700 tons of CO2.
Even though HFC-23 projects account for a small number of CDM projects (Figure 5 on page 12), in the 
early years of CDM they were responsible for generating a disproportionately large number of CERs. These 
projects were popular due to their ability to achieve large GHG emission reductions for a relatively small 
investment using well-established technologies. At the same time, these projects have been heavily criticized 
for delivering large windfall profits to their project developers.91
Specifically, it is estimated that CER revenues from HFC abatement projects in China will total $6.2 
billion, while the estimated costs of abatement are likely less than $150 million.92 In the United States and 
other developed countries, many factories (but not all) producing these waste gases have voluntarily eliminated 
their emissions. In the developing world, by contrast, these gases were simply released until the CDM gave 
these projects a financial incentive to do otherwise.
A market-based mechanism is expected to identify and capture the lowest cost emission reductions 
first, and with the HFC-23 projects, the CDM and project developers have done exactly that. These projects 
generated low cost emission reduction opportunities that were quickly exploited by the offset market. Further, 
these projects are highly additional, since there would have been no economic reason to invest in emissions 
control equipment at these facilities were it not for the CDM.
Nevertheless, in the future, few new HFC projects are likely to be eligible under the CDM. Other policies 
may actually be more appropriate for reduction projects that involve little uncertainty about mitigation 
technology and are fairly low cost. If governments and industry can agree to reduce emissions from these 
sources directly through targeted funding or regulatory approaches, this would likely be more cost effective than 
through an offset mechanism. International offset programs may be best suited for capturing the numerous 
emission reduction opportunities around the world that are smaller and are more challenging to identify and 
implement. In these cases, deploying the creativity and entrepreneurship of an offset market may be preferable.
Other policy mechanisms, like an international fund or a regime similar to the Montreal Protocol (if they 
can be established) could prove to be more cost-effective for these types of projects than the current offset 
approach, given that the amount paid for the HFC CERs far exceeded the cost to achieve those reductions.93
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In addition to the cost effectiveness of these types of offsets, another concern about HFC-23 destruction 
projects is that there is potentially a perverse incentive to produce more HCFC-22 (of which HFC-23 emissions 
are a by-product). To address this possibility, the Board has decided that only pre-existing HCFC-22 production 
facilities are eligible under CDM—new facilities cannot receive CERs. Furthermore, credits issued for existing 
facilities are based on historical HCFC-22 production levels, meaning that project owners cannot excessively 
boost CDM revenues by increasing production.94 Further measures to address this concern are also under 
consideration by the Board. A fundamental lesson from the HFC controversy is that not all issues can be 
anticipated in advance of the policy and as such, the policy must be flexible enough to accommodate a 
learning-by-doing approach. 
Another concern regarding perverse incentives was that the CDM may discourage developing countries 
from taking unilateral steps to reduce their GHG emissions.95 As projects that would happen anyway (e.g., 
those required by law) are generally not eligible to receive credit under the CDM, the concern is that developing 
countries will avoid implementing policies to reduce GHG emissions themselves in order to continue receiving 
revenues from the CDM. To address this concern, the rules of the CDM now explicitly accommodate developing 
countries wishing to take progressive measures to curb their GHG emissions. Specifically, in 2005, the Board 
issued a decision clarifying that any laws or policies put into place after November 2001 do not need to be 
taken into account in determining the baseline of CDM projects.96 Therefore, developing countries are free and 
encouraged to pass new laws to reduce GHG emissions without affecting the ability of projects that comply 
with those laws to be deemed additional and generate CERs.
Similarly, concern is often expressed that the sheer existence of a mechanism that pays for reductions 
would reduce the incentive for a country to adopt rules and regulations that require those reductions (such that 
they must be financed with domestic resources). Specifically, the concern is that the existence of the CDM 
could deter developing countries from agreeing to legally binding mitigation commitments in a future global 
agreement. In the near-term, however, this argument does not account for political and practical realities. 
Many developing countries lack the economic, administrative, and technical capacity to take on strong 
commitments to reduce emissions. Programs like the CDM can play an important role in helping developing 
countries grow their capacity by giving them access to, and experience with, clean technologies and market-
based mechanisms. For example, India is currently in the final stages of implementing an energy efficiency 
and renewable energy certificate system, and it has been reported that China is exploring the option of a 
domestic cap-and-trade program.97,98 Further, current international negotiations are exploring the possibilities 
of other crediting mechanisms like sectoral and policy-based approaches. Recent U.S. legislative proposals 
also required a gradual transition from the current CDM to a more sectoral type of crediting approach for some 
countries. Such mechanisms may create a pathway for developing countries to transition to the use of cap-and-
trade systems in the future.
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The CDM has played an important role in the international climate negotiations and discussions 
surrounding the CDM’s process and use will likely continue in the future. As the CDM builds capacity in both 
the public and the private sectors of developing countries, it also may serve as a potential bargaining tool for 
developed countries, such as the United States, who could be large buyers of CERs. Developing countries may 
potentially be more willing to accept some form of longer-term commitment to limit their emissions in return 
for maintaining a funding source for GHG mitigation technology in the short-term. To this end, the CDM will 
likely play a role in the negotiations on a future international treaty on climate change.
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VI. Summary and Conclusions
Market-based policies have shown to be cost-effective tools in mitigating emissions. Under a wide range of 
potential policy scenarios, international offsets represent some of the most economically efficient options for 
reducing global GHG emissions. 
The CDM is the primary international offset program in existence today and, while not perfect, it has 
helped to establish a global price on GHG emission reductions. Further, it has managed to establish—in just 
eight years—a fairly credible, internationally-recognized, carbon offset market that is worth $2.7 billion with 
participation from a large number of developing countries and private investors. It has also created processes 
and methodologies that other programs, like the Western Climate Initiative, are already emulating.
A “learning by doing” approach is an apt characterization of the CDM to date. While this strategy has enabled 
critics to accentuate the issues that have arisen, the alternative—debating and developing every methodology and 
procedure before launching the program, would have likely delayed the launch of the program for years and prevented 
it from achieving its objectives during the first Kyoto commitment period (i.e., 2008 through 2012). In addition, 
given the unprecedented nature of the CDM, even if it had been meticulously designed, policy makers likely would 
have found it impossible to accurately predict every challenge and some “learning by doing” would nevertheless have 
been required. A balanced assessment of the CDM should acknowledge two major conclusions—first, its early focus 
on expediency resulted in the creation of a global market in GHG emission offsets in a surprisingly short period of 
time and second, new programs are rarely perfect and in anticipation of this, the CDM was set up with the flexibility 
to adapt and alter its policy and procedures with experience—and it has and continues to do so.
The downside to the “learning-by-doing” approach is that naturally a variety of problems have surfaced. 
Initially, for example, there was limited technical guidance. With little technical guidance and little experience, 
project developers, auditors and even UNFCCC staff struggled with issues like additionality, leakage, measurement, 
and even how to audit. Consequently, it is very likely that some non-additional projects were initially registered 
and some early versions of methodologies were approved without full testing. Guidance documents and Board 
decisions are now more fully developed and widely available. The Board has also added staff and review teams to 
better evaluate and ensure the quality of projects before registration. Over the last two years, third party auditors 
have also come under increased scrutiny and the Board has sanctioned several companies. Conflicts of interest are 
inherent in the audit structure and while increased risk of penalty should help, having the Board assign auditors 
might be another option. In general, the trend towards more rigorous project review, increased standardization for 
additionality and baselines and more auditor oversight is very encouraging.
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Industrial HFC projects have provided yet another source of learning given the perverse incentives which 
have resulted. Certainly the new rules implemented by the Board about what qualifies and the tax put into 
place by China (where these projects were occurring) have made these types of projects less common. However, 
because HFC emissions are so cheaply eliminated, a policy tool other than offsets may have been warranted. 
An international fund (if it could be implemented), for example, could be used to support HFC projects and 
would likely be more cost-effective than using an offsets mechanism. In an ideal world, an international offset 
program should be reserved for addressing project types and regions where the use of offsets is more cost-
effective than other policy tools.
Yet, even with these issues, the CDM should be judged not on its past, but rather on its current operation 
and a realistic assessment of its potential, taking into account ongoing efforts at improvement and reform. 
The CDM continues to improve upon its processes as experience is gained with thousands of on-the-ground 
projects around the world. The CDM’s Executive Board has attempted to acknowledge the critiques of the 
CDM where they have been valid and much discussion is ongoing about potential changes and options for 
more standardization, expansion into countries not currently utilizing the mechanism and most importantly—
increasing its efficiency and scale. The CDM has also, in many ways, laid a foundation for technology transfer 
and capacity building for lower GHG-intensive development using an approach that actively engages private 
sector investment capital.
It is essential to recognize that after years of investment, the institutional apparatus of the CDM is fully 
operational and widely supported by industry and the international community. Currently no alternative institutional 
structure exists with a similar potential (Table 4). The creation of a new international offset system would most 
certainly require years of learning and adjustment. If high quality international offsets are to be integrated within a 
U.S. emission reduction program, and if that program is to be linked to systems in other countries, then it will be 
politically and administratively challenging, as well as potentially costly, for the United States to ignore the CDM.
Table 4. Summary of Institutional Accomplishments of the CDM
1. The CDM contains a library of over 140 standardized methodologies, and covers a diversity of project types. A great deal of 
time and resources have been expended developing, reviewing, approving, and testing methodologies. Having made this large 
upfront investment, the CDM is now able to operate with lower costs for all participants.
2. Standardized tools have been developed for a variety of functions that are common across projects such as determining 
additionality and baselines, and estimating emissions related to grid-connected electricity projects.
3. Standardized manuals, rules, and templates for auditing (i.e., validation and verification) have been developed and the 
CDM procedures for overseeing auditors are increasing in rigor.
4. The CDM has significantly added to the number and expertise of its support staff and panels from what was initially only a 
small Board. Collectively, the staff of the CDM now has several years of experience and increasingly well-elaborated rules and 
precedents.
5. National governments, including developing country host governments, have invested in institutional bodies (i.e., DNAs) 
and personnel for reviewing and approving projects.
6. Project developers, auditors, and DNAs have now established their own associations to share knowledge and promote best practices. 
7. A global registry system and international transaction log for tracking information about projects and monitoring the trading 
of offset credits has been established and linked with national GHG emission trading registries.
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Endnotes
1 The Kyoto Protocol applies to five other “greenhouse” gas categories besides CO2, each with a different global 
warming potential (GWP), which is used to convert emissions to a common unit, referred to as a carbon dioxide “equivalent.” 
For example, methane (CH4) has a global warming potential 21 times that of CO2 on a 100-year time horizon.
2 World Bank Institute (2010)
3 See McKinsey (2009) and IPCC (2007) for estimates of global cost-effective GHG emission reduction potentials.
4 In UNFCCC negotiations, developed countries are referred to as “Annex I” while developing countries are referred to 
as “Non-Annex I.”
5 Hahn and Hester (1989)
6 Additionality for Clean Air Act offsets was addressed by issuing credits to existing sources for reductions below either 
allowable emissions or actual emissions (most of which were already regulated). This approach is not feasible for the CDM since 
few sources of GHG emissions in developing countries are regulated.
7 Ellerman et al. (2000)
8	 Joint	Implementation	(JI)	is	similar	to	the	CDM	in	that	it	is	project	based;	however,	while	CDM	projects	can	only	be	
hosted in developing countries, JI projects can only be hosted in developed (Annex I) countries. Additional information can be 
found at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php.
9 Weyant (2000)
10 World Bank Institute (2010). This includes only primary (CER generation) CDM transactions. All monetary data are 
expressed in U.S. dollars.
11 The Board contains one member from each of the five United Nation’s regional groups, two members from the Parties 
included in Annex I, two Non-Annex I members and one representative of the small island developing States. Each Board 
member has a single alternate member that participates in all deliberations and substitutes in cases of his or her absence.
12 The Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC serves as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. This 
is referred to as the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). The CMP meets 
annually during the same period as the COP.
13 Under the formal terminology of the CDM, “review” refers to a process of giving special attention to a proposed project 
that appears potentially problematic. In this paper, the term is used to colloquially mean the general process of examining a 
project proposal. A formal “review” of a CDM project proposal is initiated if at least three Board members or one of the DNAs 
involved requests it.
14 A project developer may also be referred to as the “project proponent” or “project participant.”
15 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/auditor/list/index.html for complete list of DOEs.
16 Project proponents are to actively reach out to stakeholders to solicit their comments.
17 Project developers have discretion regarding the amount of time (it may be one month, one year, or more).
18 “Small scale” projects are allowed to use the same auditor for both validation and verification.
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19 “Pipeline” is commonly thought of as the complete portfolio of projects at any stage of development. Once a PDD is 
submitted to an auditor for validation, the project is commonly considered to be in the CDM pipeline.
20 These numbers are estimated by project developers and for the most part represent value prior to the implementation. 
On average, projects have delivered 96 percent of predicted CERs. See UNFCCC (2010b) and UNEP Risoe (2010).
21 World Bank Institute (2010)
22 The initial generation of CERs by project developers is referred in financial terms as primary CERs, while secondary 
CERs refers to the marketplace where CERs are traded among participants.
23 Unless otherwise noted, prices are given in U.S. dollars and reflect the price of secondary CERs. While there is no 
official definition of primary and secondary CERS, common understanding is that secondary CERs tend to be CDM credits 
that have been resold and bear minimal delivery risk. In contrast, primary CERs are those issued (now and future) to project 
developers based on the underlying project. Because a project may have many years worth of credits, forward contracts are often 
used to monetize the value of these credits and consequently there is greater “delivery and performance” risk for this forward 
credit stream. CER prices tend to reflect this risk with primary CERs selling at prices that are typically lower than secondary.
24 EUAs and CERs trade on the market for a variety of prices. Prices reflect December delivery of 2012 vintage EUAs 
and primary CERs as reported by Point Carbon’s CDM Monitor (July 2010).
25 EPA (2009)
26 EPA (2010). Differing international offset assumptions account for much of the allowance price range. Notably, 
avoided deforestation and forest management account for many of international offsets in the model even though these are not 
currently allowed in CDM.
27 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/Validation/index.html.
28 The CDM Board charges an administration fee to project developers for project registration. The fee level depends on 
the	size	of	the	GHG	reduction	project;	small	projects	incur	no	fee	and	the	largest	projects	incur	a	maximum	fee	of	$350,000.	
The cost of developing small scale project methodologies is also borne by the project developer. Project developers in least-
developed countries, however, pay no fees until their first credits are issued.
29 Although Wetzelaer et al. (2007) includes the major categories of transaction costs, other categories could include (for 
some projects): preparation of a feasibility study, preparations of Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPAs), selecting 
and contracting with an auditor, any pre-validation preparation, support for the stakeholder consultation, and engagement with 
the Designated National Authority (DNA).
30 Estimates do not include forestry projects.
31 The carbon dioxide equivalent for HFC-23 is 11,700 and for N2O is 310.
32 OQI (2008) and OQI (2009)
33 Gillenwater (2011 forthcoming)
34 ELI (2002) and Hahn and Hester (1989)
35 Trexler et al. (2006)
36 Under CDM, anyone can at any time suggest a new approach to addressing additionality for a specific project type 
by submitting a proposed new or revised methodology. Further, the Board has issued public calls for suggestions to improve its 
process for determining additionality on several occasions. The current process reflects input received from those calls.
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39 If biomass used for combustion is assumed to be replanted and regrown, in the accounting of CO2 emissions it can be 
treated as zero net emissions.
40 In some developing countries, government regulations may rarely, if ever, be enforced, and therefore noncompliance 
may be the norm. In such cases, the CDM also considers the enforceability of laws and regulations.
41 Such as internal rate of return, net present value, cost benefit ratio, or unit cost of service (e.g., levelized cost of 
electricity production in $/kWh or levelized cost of delivered heat in $/GJ).
42 Unfortunately, the requirement for sensitivity analysis has not met expectations for transparency and improvement to 
the investment analysis tool and other changes are currently under consideration.
43 Essential distinctions may include a significant change in circumstances for the proposed CDM project compared 
to the circumstances for similar projects. For example, new barriers may have arisen, or promotional policies may have ended 
or cannot be accessed, leading to a situation in which the proposed CDM project is no longer financially attractive without the 
incentive provided by the CDM. The change must be verifiable.
44 Another issue is the erroneous rejection of project proposals that are actually additional. Although this problem has 
less environmental impact, it does reduce the program value for project developers. The inclusion of an appeals process for 
rejected proposals could help reduce the prevalence of these “false negatives.”
45 See UNFCCC (2001), Decision 17/CP.7, paragraph 1
46 This study includes many projects from the initial years of the CDM when project review was less rigorous and 
rejection rates were lower. Since then, the Board has significantly increased its oversight of the process and rejection rates are 
now much higher.
47 Flues et al. (2008)
48 IETA (2009) and Schneider (2009)
49 OQI (2009), IETA (2009), Flues et al. (2008), and Schneider (2007)
50 Numerous other improvements have been recommended by various stakeholders, for example see IETA (2009) and 
Schneider (2009).
51 Schneider (2009) and Castro and Michaelowa (2010)
52 Au Yong (2009)
53 UNFCCC (2008) and UNFCCC (2010c)
54 Schneider et al. (2008)
55 All CDM methodologies are publicly available at: http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/approved.html.
56 The CDM is also developing a standardized tool for completing the investment analysis.
57 This CDM methodology panel is also supported by a roster of peer reviewers from around the world who are experts on 
specific technologies and industries.
58 See UNFCCC (2005b), Decision 3/CMP.1, paragraph 45. “A baseline shall be established…[in] a transparent and 
conservative manner regarding the choice of approaches, assumptions, methodologies, parameters, data sources, key factors and 
additionality, and taking into account uncertainty.”
59 For example, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Climate Action Reserve, the Voluntary Carbon Standard, and 
the Gold Standard.
60 See Scott (2008)
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61 Because it is project developers who propose new methodologies for quantifying emission reductions, in the early days 
of the CDM, there were few standardized methodologies available for use, which did increase the costs for project developers to 
create new methodologies and for the UN to review them.
62 WCI (2010)
63 IETA (2009)
64 In an effort to deal with the expanding number of methodologies, decisions and general guidance documents, a 
searchable catalog of CDM decisions has now been made available at http://vk.cdmis.net/Reference/catalogue/search.
65 Auditors are also subject to “spot checks” and the Board can suspend an auditor’s accreditation upon review.
66 See types of small-scale CDM project activities (SSC) in Glossary of CDM terms at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/
glossary.html. 
67 Schneider (2007)
68 In November 2008 the CDM Board temporarily suspended the accreditation of one the program’s largest auditors, Det 
Norske Veritas (DNV), for problems with its audit practices. In reviewing the auditor’s work, the Board determined that DNV was 
non-conforming with a number of CDM requirements. The Board suspended another large auditor, SGS, in September 2009 and 
two more, KEMCO (partial suspension) and TUEV SUED, in March 2010. After corrective actions were taken, DNV’s and SGS’s 
accreditations were reinstated in February of 2009 and December 2009, respectively. The Board has also rejected the 2008 
reaccreditation application of another auditor, the Japan Consulting Institute.
69 Although project approval time has improved, the length continues to be a deterrent to project investors. 
70 Monthly average lag time between the beginning of the 30-day public comment period and request for registration. 
UNEP Risoe (2010).
71 Such a training requirement could be modeled after the existing UN training program for Expert Review Team 
members that review national GHG emission inventories submitted under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The Executive 
Board appears to be moving this direction, as indicated at the 50th meeting of the Board in 2009.
72 In many jurisdictions, CERs are treated as rights sui-generis (quasi-property rights).
73 Training and capacity building support for developing country DNAs could help them better ensure that domestic laws 
addressing ownership and other issues are fully addressed.
74 Information on the CDM registry is available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Registry/index.html.
75 CER “recycling” created controversy in Europe in early 2010. Specifically, the practice involved countries swapping 
for resale CERs surrendered for compliance under the EU’s emissions trading scheme for “hot air” emission allowances 
allocated to former Soviet bloc countries. CERs are viewed as more valuable in the global emissions trading market than these 
“hot air” allowances. The EU Commission issued rules to avoid this in the future. 
76 The project boundary is all sources of GHGs under the control of the project participants that are significant and 
reasonably attributable to the CDM project.
77 In the climate policy area, the term “leakage” is often used in a variety of ways. In some contexts, it refers to fugitive 
emissions (e.g., methane releases from natural gas pipelines), in others it may refer to the potential macroeconomic effects of 
GHG mitigation policy causing a shift in emissions-intensive industries to countries without emission constraints. 
78 While an avoided deforestation project is used here for explanatory purpose, they are not currently eligible under CDM. 
Significant discussion, however, is underway on how to eventually include this type of activity.
79 Under the rules of the CDM, afforestation and reforestation involves the replanting of an area with trees that has been 
without forest for at least 50 years or since 31 December 1989, respectively. In general, though, afforestation is the process 
of establishing a forest on land that is not a forest, or has not been a forest for a long time. Reforestation is the restocking of 
existing forests that have been deforested.
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80 UNFCCC (2010b)
81 This supports the assessment that the CDM contributes to technology transfer by lowering several technology-transfer 
barriers and by raising the transfer quality. See Schneider et al. (2008).
82 See, for example, Pearson (2005).
83 See World Commission on Environment and Development (1987).
84 During the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries insisted that they be given complete discretion 
on how sustainable development was defined and measured, which effectively determines what is considered as sufficient 
sustainable development benefits for a project to be approved. DNAs are to evaluate key linkages between national sustainable 
development goals and CDM projects. As it stands, the definition of sustainable development and how CDM projects should 
contribute to it is a host country’s sovereign decision.
85 Many countries do publish project eligibility guidelines that include some criteria that, a priori, exclude projects 
that are less likely to deliver domestic sustainable development benefits. But in most cases these guidelines are vague and not 
stringently applied.
86 Schneider (2007), Sutter and Parreño (2007), Olsen and Fenhann (2008), and Boyd et al. (2009) 
87 Schneider (2007)
88 Some countries (e.g., China) are electing to utilize some of the CDM credit revenue from these large industrial 
projects to reinvest in other activities that do produce more sustainable development benefits.
89 See, for example, Sutter (2007). In addition, efforts like the “Development Dividend” initiative of the International 
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APPENDIX
Table 1. All CDM projects in Pipeline as of March 2010
Projects
Expected 
CERs/yr Number How the project types are defined 
Afforestation/Reforestation 5,084 58 Replanting an area with trees that has been without forest
Agriculture 10 1 Irrigation, alternative fertilizers, rice crop CH4 (Biogas under methane avoidance)
Biomass energy 53,094 855 New plant using biomass or existing ones changing from fossil to bio-mass, also biofuels
Cement 8,754 57 Lime in the cement is replaced by other materials, or neutralization with lime is avoided
CO2 capture 29 3
Recovered CO2 from tail gas substituting fossil fuels for production 
of CO2
Coal bed/mine methane 43,727 77 CH4 is collected from coal mines or coal beds. This includes Ventilation Air Methane (VAM)
EE Households 1,409 35 Energy Efficiency improvements in domestic houses and appliances
EE Industry 5,602 203 End-use Energy Efficiency improvements in industry 
EE own generation 73,878 558 Waste heat or waste gas used for electricity production in industry
EE service 258 27 Energy Efficiency improvements in buildings and appliances 
EE Supply side 29,162 86 More efficient power plants producing electricity and district heat, Coal Field Fire Extinguishing
Energy distribution 5,426 18 Reduction in losses in transmission/distribution of electricity/district heat, Country interconnection
Fossil fuel switch 48,792 150 Switch from one fossil fuel to another fossil fuel (including new natural gas power plants)
Fugitive 18,219 45 Recovery instead of flaring of CH4 from oil wells, gas pipeline leaks, charcoal production, fires in coal piles
Geothermal 3,447 15 Geothermal energy
HFCs 82,498 23 HFC-23 destruction
Hydro 159,773 1523 New hydro power plants
Landfill gas 48,236 320 Collection of landfill gas, composting of MSW, or incinerating of the waste instead of landfilling
Methane avoidance 36,136 696 Projects producing biogas from manure, waste water, industrial waste, palm oil waste, or avoid CH4 by composting or aerobic treatment
N2O 50,261 70 N2O reduction from nitric and adipic acid, production 
PFCs and SF6 4,054 15 Reduction of emissions of PFCs and SF6
Solar 1,119 48 Solar PV, solar water heating, solar cooking
Tidal 315 1 Tidal power
Transport 2,396 25 More efficient transport
Wind 84,441 967 Wind power
Total 766,119 5876
Source: UNEP Risoe (2010)
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Table 2. Types of Methodologies Used in the CDM
Sectors covered Number of projects using the methodology Number of methodologies




CO2 capture 2 2
Coal bed/mine methane 78 2
Energy distribution 14 3
Energy efficiency, Households 20 12
Energy efficiency, own generation (of 
electricity) 482 6
Energy efficiency, Service 0 1
Energy efficiency, Supply side 79 11
Fossil fuel switch 95 5
Fugitive emission from fuels 39 8
HFCs 20 1
Landfill 227 7
Methane avoidance (Solid waste) 132 8
Methane avoidance (Liquid waste) 70 6
N2O 76 4
PFCs and SF6 15 6
Transport 11 2
Zero emission renewables 1552 5
Small scale (including A/R CDM) 3183 55
Source: UNEP Risoe (2010)
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